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This paper revisits the contested issue of the impact of agricultural extension
on farm productivity. Often studies in this ￿eld su⁄er from a bias either due
to self-selection of the best farmers for the extension services or to endogenous
placement of the programme. The panel dataset collected by ANADER and the
nature of the extension programme put into operation in C￿te d￿Ivoire between
1997 and 2001, allow to control for such biases and to deliver more robust
estimates. The results indicate a positive impact of extension on yields, after
controlling for other factors of production and for time and location e⁄ects.
While such e⁄ect is signi￿cant and of considerable magnitude for food crops,
co⁄ee and cocoa outputs seem to have behaved di⁄erently. The results seem to
suggests a tendency for farmers involved in extension to reduce their e⁄orts in
co⁄ee and cocoa production, a ￿nding consistent with the recent experience in
thecountry. Once welook atrevenuetheoverall impact of extension disappears,
indicating that the switch from cash to food crops, despite being the optimal
choice during a period of deep crises for perennial crops in the international
markets, did not increase the revenues of farmers.
⁄The author is at the Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford and a
consultant at the World Bank.
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CSAE WPS/2003-071 Introduction
Extension programmes improve productivity primarily through two mechanisms: in-
novation and training. They constitute the main link between agricultural research
institutions and the farmers. In addition todi⁄using newtechnology supplied by such
institutions, they provide feedback from the farmers to the research centres them-
selves. Extension services also o⁄er training in existing techniques. They improve
the knowledge base of farmers through a variety of means, such as demonstrations,
model plots, speci￿c training, group meetings and so on.
The exposure to such activities is intended to increase the ability of farmers to use
their resources e¢ciently and ultimately increase crops￿ yields. Given the potential
of extension services, and the amount of resources invested over the years in such
activities, it comes with no surprise that the literature on the impact of extension
programmes is quite rich. In their 1991 paper Birkhaeuser, Evenson and Feder review
several studies published between 1970 and 1989, and ￿nd 11 estimates of the impact
of extension on yields being signi￿cant and positive, with coe¢cients indicating up to
27% elasticity of output to extension services. Evenson (forthcoming) reviews more
than 60 studies which address the issue of the impact of extension and research in a
number of di⁄erent approaches, and ￿nds that most of them report positive rates.
Even though the results of the impact of extension services on agricultural pro-
duction seem homogeneously positive, several studies have recommended caution in
interpreting the results. There are a number of problems connected to such analysis,
three of which are recurrent:
1. Endogenous placement bias. Often the governments place programmes in
regions which are likely to be more responsive to the dissemination of innovation and
training provided by extension agents. Such deliberateplacement createsa correlation
2between the regressor and the error that leads to a bias in the coe¢cients.
2. Selection bias. Particularly skilled farmers have more experience or come
from more knowledgeable households and are therefore more likely to seek extension
agents advice and to be involved in their activities. In the same manner the agents
themselves might prefer to work with such farmers, making them again more likely
to be selected to be part of the agent￿s contact groups. If the model does not control
for these characteristics and leaves some variables omitted from the model, the error
term will incorporate them. Due to the higher probability for such individuals to be
involved in extension services, this will imply that the error term can be correlated,
once again, with the regressor. The result of selection bias will therefore be similar
to the case of endogenous placement, i.e. inconsistent coe¢cients.
3. Simultaneity bias. If farmers call in the extension agents only in the moment
of need, then the agents will visit regularly farmers which are having problems, in-
troducing a bias in the sample of contacted farmers. This would cause the coe¢cient
of extension to be negative.
While thesebiases are well known and recommendations for caution are frequent in
the literature, very few studies are based on a dataset that allows to control for them.
Cross sectional analysis is not ideal to answer the technology adoption and impact
question, and coe¢cient estimated are di¢cult to interpret and, often, biased (Besley
and Case 1993). The focus has mainly been on choosing an extension variable that is
￿exogenous to individual households and internalizes inter-farmer communications￿
(Brikhauser et al., 1991, p.613 as cited in Evenson and Mwabu, 1998). Unfortunately
it is di¢cult to de￿ne a convincingly exogenous extension variable: even variables
based on - for example - ratio of extension sta⁄ per farm, are indeed dependent on
the number of farms in the sample cluster. This number, though, will naturally be
the consequence of a decision process taken by farmers, and therefore endogenous.
3(Evenson and Mwabu, 1998). This study tries to take a step forward in this direction
drawing on a panel sample collected by ANADER between 1997 and 2000 in C￿te
d￿Ivoire. The nature of the dataset allows to approach this problem from a di⁄erent
perspective: accepting the inevitable endogeneity of the extension variable, we control
for farmers￿ unobservable characteristics (that are the source of the endogeneity) with
individual ￿xed e⁄ects (for a similar approach see Owens et al. 2003).
2 Di⁄usion of agricultural technology in C￿te d￿Ivoire
ANADER is the coordinating agencies for extension services in C￿te d￿Ivoire. It acts
as the intermediary between agricultural science research centres and the farmers.
It does so through a network of o¢ces distributed throughout the country and a
workforce of agents and agronomists residing in villages, in charge of the creation
and running of the contact groups and of the di⁄usion of innovation themes and
techniques.
ANADER provides advice for all crops, both cash crops and food crops. Most
of the advice is rather simple and straight forward, and it involves the preparation
of the ￿elds and the respect of optimal distances between the stems, fertilization
techniques, pesticides treatment, creation of plant nurseries. Of course the advice is
plant speci￿c and involves more complex issues related to each speci￿c crop, such as
protection and treatment of parasites diseases. Table 1 gives a summary of the main
training carried out by ANADER in 2000.
Cash crops, co⁄ee and cocoa, tend to carry slightly better results in terms of
adoption of the techniques di⁄used by the agents. Nevertheless, it seems that the
practices disseminated for co⁄ee and cocoa are more likely to be already established
among the farmers, therefore not likely to have a decisive impact on the yields. This
4result is in line with the recent experience of the ANADER agents, that report an
increase in the di⁄usion of techniques for food crops and a decrease in the ￿ow of
innovations regarding co⁄ee and cocoa. This is consistent with the usual diminishing
returns argument for the e⁄ectiveness of extension services: indeed given the stage of
the rural sector in the country, and the relatively long history of extension services,
it is likely that most of the quite large and permanent innovations have already
been di⁄used among the co⁄ee and cocoa growers (Evenson, forthcoming; Deaton
and Benjamin, 1988). The most signi￿cant advice given to farmers during the years
of analysis concerns replanting, part of the innovation theme that goes under the
name of ￿Soil preparation and distancing between plants￿. It is remarkable how
relatively few farmers (none for cocoa and 28.1% for co⁄ee) applied in some ways the
advice received. This doesn￿t come as a surprise given the low pro￿tability of these
crops during years of low prices, making unlikely a further investment in the crop.
Replanting, it is important to underline, has a long term impact, as both cocoa and
co⁄ee trees do not bear fruits for the ￿rst 3-5 years after being planted (Carr, 1993).
Co⁄ee and cocoa markets experienced a recession from 1997 to 2000 due mainly
to excessive capacity. Prices have been extraordinarily low, especially co⁄ee prices
that have plummeted after the boom of the mid-1990s (see ￿gure 1). In the survey
starting year (1997), 37% of the revenue of the farming activities for the households
in the sample used for the analysis came from the production of co⁄ee and cocoa (at
the aggregate level co⁄ee and cocoa account for 18% of GDP and more than 45% of
total exports) (World Bank, 1999). It is evident that a drop in the prices of these
commodities, in the absence of a minimum price scheme, can have a deep impact
on the investment and production decisions of the farmers. Figure 2 and ￿gure 3
give an indication of the overall quantities of food crops and cash crops produced
in the country over the period in analysis. Cocoa overall exports are stable, while
5co⁄ee exports decrease signi￿cantly. Interestingly overall revenues from the exports
of these two crops drop drastically because of decreasing international prices. Food
crops production seems to increase slightly over the years in analysis (IMF, 2000)
The country recently liberalized both the co⁄ee and cocoa markets. The market-
ing board, that insured a minimum price for all farmers, was gradually dismantled
allowing private actors to enter the market and to provide all the services necessary
to deliver the commodities from the farmers to the exporters. The 1999/2000 season
was the ￿rst in a fully liberalized context (McIntire and Varangis, 1999)
The impact of this austere period in the international market of co⁄ee and cocoa
was ampli￿ed in C￿te d￿Ivoire by the progressive deterioration of the political situ-
ation. Starting at the end of 1997 C￿te d￿Ivoire went through the worst crisis since
its independence in 1960. The subsequent recession brought the economy virtually to
a halt, with devastating consequences for the population. Most of donor assistance
was suspended and the sudden and frequent change of leadership was not conducive
to the implementation of any development programme.
3 The Model
Farmers productivity can be augmented by the introduction of new techniques. Such
techniques are both concerned with improved cultivation practices, and with the use
of inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides. Feder and Slade (1985) developed a model
which includes the e⁄ect of both these innovations. They set up a production function
augmented by a knowledge factor:
Yit = g(Kit) ⁄ F[Li,h(Kit) ⁄ Nit] (1)
6Where Yit is total output of the farm belonging to farmer i at time t, Kit is his/her
knowledge level, L is the quantity of ￿xed inputs (land) owned, Nit is the quantity of
variable inputs utilized; F(.) is a well behaved production function (with positive and
decreasing marginal productivity) and g(.) and h(.) are - respectively - the general
and input speci￿c knowledge functions. As a farmer accumulates knowledge she/he
can be expected to increase her or his e¢ciency, therefore produce more output for a
given amount of inputs. As Feder and Slade notice, knowledge is not neatly divisible
in the two categories: input speci￿c and general. Indeed an extension agent￿s visit is
likely to supply the farmer with information that combine general practices and use
of speci￿c inputs (and indeed it appears as Kit in both knowledge functions). While
such distinction can lead to interesting speci￿cations, the limitations of the dataset
used for this study would not allow us to identify the impacts of knowledge separately
for the two e⁄ects. We therefore opted for a simpler version of the model, as originally
introduced by Kislev and Shchori-Bachrach (1973). The impact of knowledge on the
production function can be seen as a shift in the production frontier. Starting from
equation (1) as K increases, g(.) converges to an upper limit g⁄ as the farmer￿s cu-
mulative knowledge increases to its maximum. Farmers who do not receive extension
are limited to K0 and, consequently, to g⁄
0, while farmers that receive extension can
accumulate knowledge up to K1 and reach g⁄
1 >g ⁄
0.
This version includes - among the determinants of the general knowledge function
- a variable describing the farmer￿s ￿raw labour￿ and personal skills (interpreted as
a shadow wage, w):
Yit = g(Kit,w it) ⁄ F[Li,N it] (2)
The inclusion of this variable has an important implication: the overall impact of
knowledge will depend upon the skills and quality of the farmers. If we take g such
7that 0 • g • 1 (that implies g =1being the maximum impact of knowledge), then
















The marginal contribution of knowledge is non-negative and declining: as knowl-
edge increases the knowledge function converges to 1, its marginal contribution de-
clining to 0. Kislev and Shchori-Bachrach also postulate the existence of two classes
of products, according to the potential that the combination of knowledge and per-
sonal skills can have on the e¢ciency of their production. We can summarize their
point with the following expression:
g(w,1) • 1
If g(w,1)=1given in￿nite knowledge and whatever the unobservable quality of
the farmer, the impact of knowledge on production of this class of products is already
at its maximum. In other words the farmer￿s personal skills do not count. In the
class of products characterized by g(w,1) < 1, instead, an individual e⁄ect exists
and will determine the ultimate level of g. The distinction between these two cases
does not need to be de￿ned along the line of no technological innovation vs. high
potential technological innovation in the product. In fact g(w,1) < 1 could be true
even in a technologically static setting: some production techniques and methods
8will be more easily learnt and applied by more skilled farmers. This is likely in an
agricultural setting in developing countries: even very low-technology innovations
(such as plant distancing, pruning, proper use of pesticides, etc.) are not likely to
be widespread. Together with the assumption that
δg
δw ‚ 0,t h ec a s eg(w,1) < 1
implies that farmers with better education, coming from a wealthier background,
with better access to inputs or simply more skilled, are likely to be adopting this
class of products more quickly and successfully than average. This observation has
an important implication: trying to carry out an empirical analysis on the basis of
this model without an appropriate control for individual e⁄ects will lead to biased
estimates.
4 The data
The data come from a panel data survey managed by ANADER on a sample of 2500
households evenly spread across the territory. The survey was collected between 1997
and 2000, and gathered information about production during the ending farming sea-
son (so data collected in 1999 pertain to the 1998-1999 farming season). This survey
is collected among a sub-sample of a bigger survey (comprising more than 10,000
households) collected only once between 1996 and 1997 and containing additional
information about the households. This data was also available for the analysis.
The cross sectional part of the survey depicts an agricultural system where land
and labour are the major inputs. It is almost completely non-mechanized and very
few households have access to animal traction or chemical fertilizers and pesticides,
as indicated by the summary statistics reported in table 2. Farmers have medium size
plots, quite far from the village, and tend to have small-medium size households. 75%
of the farmers interviewed reporting having more than one crop on their land, while
9only 25% report having a singlecrop farm. Moreover multicrop farms had, on average,
between 3 and 4 di⁄erent crop types cultivated on their land. Table 3 reports some
simple results derived from a cross sectional production function estimation based
on the 1997 dataset. The table reports results for both quantities and values of
production as a dependent variable. The resulting production function is useful as a
benchmark for the results we will get later from the panel dataset. Land and labour
seem to be the most important inputs for production; fertilizers and pesticides - in
the rather unlikely case in which they are used - seem to have a positive e⁄ect on
production and on total valueof production. Femalefarmers tend to bedisadvantaged
for permanent crops, which re￿ects the gender discrimination in production of such
crops in C￿te d￿Ivoire (Du￿o and Udry 2003).
The panel data survey focused on farmers production capabilities, with precise
information about single plots and crops for each household.
While this survey was ￿rst collected in 1997, unfortunately the data for that
year is not usable, due to some mishandling of the questionnaires. The problem was
subsequently solved, leaving three usable years in the panel: 1998, 1999 and 2000.
Tables 4 to 7 summarize the trends in average production per household, average
total land surface per household, average crop density, and yields for some of the
crops object of the analysis during the period 1998-2000.
The yields levels for cocoa seem to have deteriorated considerably from 1998
to 2000. Quite interestingly the average size of the cocoa yields tends to decrease
substantially, especially from 1999 to 2000. This result is consistent with the more
accurate analysis possible through panel data: in fact following the households from
period to period we come to a similar conclusion. With the exception of some few
farmers that increased cocoa cultivated areas extensively, on average there was a
contraction in the size of cocoa plots. This is con￿rmed by the decrease in average
10output per households. Similar conclusions, regarding the size of the plots, can be
drawn from the analysis of the co⁄ee data. Again the reduction in output is quite
drastic: for co⁄ee, in particular, thisdecreasein not associated with a major reduction
in yields, but is re￿ected in the statistics on the country aggregate production . This
could be due to a reduction in the e⁄ort and land dedicated to co⁄ee cultivation and
harvesting during a period of low prices and consequent low pro￿tability. Figure 1
reports the international and farmgate price level for co⁄ee and cocoa over the years
of analysis while ￿gure 2 reports the export quantities and values.
The story for food crops seems to be much more linear: both in the case of rice
and yam the values of average output, plot surface and yield do not seem to follow a
speci￿c pattern, nor they undergo any structural changes.
Table8 illustrates theparticipation rates to theextension programme ofthe house-
holds in the sample. There is a slight increase in the participation rates between 1998
and 1999, which is contemporary to the period of expansion of ANADER activities
in the country, and general restructuring of the extension programme. The variation
of the status of the households, between one year and the next, constitutes the fun-
damental source of variation that we are testing in our model. Table 9 shows the
movements in and out of the programmes of the households interviewed. It is clear
from the numbers of the observations in the table that, as it often happens with panel
data, only a small proportion of the total households in the sample were tracked down
year after year, while many were not re-interviewed. There doesn￿t seem to be any
special pattern or reason that explains the drop out rate.
5T h e s p e c i ￿ c a t i o n
We can consider the following production setting:
11Y = F(x,f,s, k, q) (3)
Where
Y = output
x = variable inputs
f = ￿xed inputs
l = land quantity
s = soil quality
k = knowledge on innovations
q = quality of the farmers.
Thereareseveral empirical options to identifythe impact ofinnovations on output;
the ￿rst step consists in identifying a meaningful proxy for k, the variable describing
the knowledge on the innovation. This analysis will use membership in the contact
groups of the extension agency to represent exposureto knowledge. This choicemight
not be ideal: it does not give us any information on the amount of knowledge of the
farmer on the innovation and it doesn￿t qualify the kind of innovation object of the
visits. Still the data constrain the choice to this indicator, which is anyway in line
with the literature (Evenson, forthcoming). Fixed inputs (except land), soil quality
and the quality of farmers (f, s and q) can be considered time-invariant given the
short time span available for analysis. Variable inputs (mainly fertilizers/pesticides
and hired labour) were not explicitly included among the information collected by
the survey. This limitation in the data availability may not prove to be undesirable.
As we noticed earlier the danger of endogeneity of variable inputs is particularly
severe: it is likely that the choices regarding the adoption and usage of inputs such
as fertilizers and pesticides are strongly in￿uenced by the advice of extension agents,
12by the weather conditions or by the change in the market prices. Of course other
factors contribute to such choices, typically location e⁄ects or income and credit
constraints. Using information from the 1997 cross sectional survey, though, it is
clear that both fertilizers and pesticides are not a major input in the production
function for the farmers in the sample. In 1997 4.5% of the plots included in the
survey were fertilized while pesticides were used in only 7% of the plots. Still we will
proxy usage of modern inputs with dummy variables on the quality of the material
planted and the layout of the ￿elds; this is a delicate variable as it is potentially
collinear with extension advice: we test for multicollinearity of this variable with the
extension variable following thesimple R2 comparison procedure suggested by Greene
1990 (p269)1. The test rejects the hypothesis of multicollinearity. This solution can
help us to disentangle the e⁄ect of extension on knowledge led e¢ciency from access
to inputs minimizing the potential danger of introducing endogenous input variables
into the regression.
Labour would be ideally described by a variable with speci￿c per crop informa-
tion, such as numbers of day worked per plot. Unfortunately this information is not
available in the panel survey, so a family labour supply proxy is used instead. From
experience on the ￿eld it was noticed that the family allocates the plots available for
cultivation between adult household members which become each responsible for a
plot. We therefore construct a labour proxy by using the household adult members
(15 to 65 years old) divided by the number of plots cultivated by the household.
The production function approach presents one limitation: type and quantities of
inputs chosen can be endogenous. As time goes by, farmers might adjust their choices
to the weather or the market conditions. As we control for ￿xed e⁄ect, only crop/plot
speci￿c endogeneity will be a cause of concern. Solutions in the literature rely mainly
1For the details of the test see the Appendix
13on dual cost or dual pro￿t functions, where thesechoices areexplicitly modelled. This
solution is often unfeasible in the context of developing countries, where few inputs go
through the market and observations on prices are missing or inaccurate (as indeed
is the case in Cote d￿Ivoire). These concerns are more problematic than the potential
endogeneity of the inputs, and therefore we stick to the original production function
setting. The limitation of this choice will be kept in mind in modelling and then in
interpreting the results.
Another problem is the multiple output technology. Farmers produce di⁄er-
ent combination of crops, some perennial some annual, additionally they sometimes
change the crop mix from year to year. Several solutions to aggregate di⁄erent crop
quantities were considered. Distance functions seem to be a commonly chosen so-
lution in the literature (see Shephard, 1970 for a theoretical treatment and Corelli
and Perelman, 1999 for a recent application). Another proposed solution is to use a
ray production frontier, where the euclidean norm and the angle are used to describe
di⁄erent output vectors and aggregate them (see Lothgren 1997). Both these solu-
tions do not appear to be suitable in this data context. Firstly they usually require
that all agents produce all outputs, a condition naturally not met by the Ivorian
farmers. Secondly these methods, given the intense manipulation of the data, are
very sensitive to measurement error which is often inevitable in household surveys
from developing countries. A possible solution is to use prices to aggregate the data
into revenue measures. This method, applicable only with price data, is based on
pro￿t, revenue or cost functions which implicitly rely on strong behavioural assump-
tions. The information available on prices in the Ivorian dataset is poor and the
pro￿t maximizing assumptions may turn out to be unrealistic in a context where
often most of the production does not go through the market. We therefore ￿rst
prefer to proceed by aggregating the di⁄erent crops and setting up a single output
14(quantity) measure, controlling for di⁄erent crops with speci￿c dummies as depen-
dent variables. This setting will give more power to the analysis, as farmers grow
several crops simultaneously: regressing on the aggregate output allows for better
controls of the unobservable quality of farmers. Also, we are able to control for some
of the inputs at crop level within each household (quantity of land and density of the
stems); this allows us to control for the di⁄erent allocation of inputs during di⁄erent
crops. The drawback of this setting is that it assumes implicitly that the di⁄erences
in the impact of the di⁄erent inputs, including extension services, among the crops
can be picked up by an intercept, i.e. it is uniform across crops. We will introduce
interaction terms to allow the variation in the slopes of the inputs.
Not including information about the price levels, and therefore the overall value
of production, may cause an omitted variable problem with a consequent endogeneity
of some of the inputs variables (such as labour). Indeed input allocation (and e⁄ort
levels) arelikely tohave changed over the period of analysis due to the sharp variation
in price levels for key crops, such as cocoa and co⁄ee. Further more the year to year
decision of what crops to plant depends on prices, so it is important to include this
information into the analysis. We will therefore try a di⁄erent speci￿cation, using
prices for perennial and food crops to control for the incentive structure in the rural
economy. While value regressions area widely adopted solution, there are several
problems connected to it. The inaccuracy of the price data can be source of biased
results. But price data is typically inaccurate in household surveys because farmers
have limited information on prices, often because only a small proportion of their
overall production goes through the market. Care needs to be applied in interpreting
the results from these regressions.
The widely used Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation for the aggregate production func-
tion seems to be the most suitable tool to model the production activities of the
15farmers. Previous studies have used other, more complex (and more parametric),
speci￿cations. While these models add in terms of precision in the identi￿cations of
the parameters, they introduce a problem of multicollinearity (Bindlish and Evenson,
1997). Of course the Cobb-Douglas production function imposes some restrictions
on the coe¢cient which might not be suitable to our case: unity elasticity of sub-
stitution between the inputs, constant partial elasticity of production for all input
intensities, and so on. Still, recent literature tends to con￿rm that the Cobb-Douglas
performs well enough in rural production frameworks, with the advantage of the few
parameters and of the simple implementation (Gautam and Anderson, 1999). Fac-
tors of production can therefore be incorporated rather simply using the following
framework:
φi =ƒ k(zki)αk (4)
where φi is the e⁄ect on output y of number of factors (z1, z2,e t c . ),s u c ha st h e
ones we have previously identi￿ed in the setting (1), and αk are the coe¢cients to be
estimated. Taking the logs of (4) we obtain the following linear equation:
ln φi =§ kαklnzki (5)
If the αk were zero, then lnφi =0would imply φi =1so output would not
be a⁄ected in any way by the variables. Likewise if αk is positive, it implies a φi
greater then one, therefore a positive impact of variable k on output; if αk is negative
it implies a φi smaller than one, and therefore a negative elasticity of income to
variable k.
Another advantage of such setting is that zs can be either levels of variables or
their exponential. Since in the econometric setting we will be working with lnφi this
16implies that levels will lead to a speci￿cation in logarithms, while exponentials will
lead to a speci￿cation in levels. If we expect output to be roughly proportional to an
input, then it would make sense to enter it in log form (changes in the two variables
would therefore be proportional). If, instead, we expect the input to increase the
output of always the same ￿xed percentage, then it should be entered in levels. The
interpretation of the coe¢cients of variables entered in levels is, naturally, di⁄erent
from the one for coe¢cients entered in logarithms. The coe¢cients of the variables
entered in levels, in particular, will not be the elasticities (as it is the case normally
with the variable entered in logarithms), butwill bethe powerof the exponential. The
coe¢cientof dummy variableswill have yet another interpretation: itwill measure the
discontinuous e⁄ecton thedependent variableofthepresence ofthe factor represented
by the dummy variable (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980).
5.1 Estimation methodology: some issues
The panel structure of the data allows the use of ￿xed e⁄ect estimation. This tech-
nique assumes that di⁄erences across units of the sample, in our case the households,
can be captured by di⁄erences in the constant term. Such di⁄erences can be esti-
mated, creating in fact a individual e⁄ect coe¢cient estimated for each household in
the sample. Despite the unit of the panel is the household it is important to under-
line that the unit of observation of the production function is the single crop in the
household. We had the choice, setting up the estimation procedure, to select as a unit
of the panel each crop for each household. These would have been very helpful to
control for unobservable soil di⁄erences. Crops (except perennials) are rotated every
year, though, so that the soil used for each crop changes from year to year, making
the panel analysis at the crops level inadequate.
17Using individual ￿xed e⁄ects allows to remove from the regression the unobserv-
able static di⁄erences among the households therefore taking care, at least partially,
of the concerns related to the problem of selection bias. Indeed if - as in this case
- time invariant household unobservables are correlated with regressors, there is no
real alternative to ￿xed e⁄ects estimation. Previous literature has extensively used
instrumental variables (IV) speci￿cations to account for the inevitable endogeneity
of input variables (in particular of the innovation variable) due to the lack of ade-
quate information about the household unobservable di⁄erences; the conditions for
this model to work are stringent: any household level variable (usually the only in-
formation available in household surveys) is potentially correlated with household
unobservables, making them an inadequate instrument.
Our test will take the following regression form:
ln(yields)ijt =l n ( labour)it +l n (density)ijt + number of plotsit+ membership in extension it
+materialit+ layoutit + regions ⁄ year dummies + crop dummiesijt + vi + uijt. (6)
Where:
yields: sum of the surface of the plots for each crop in the household;
Labour: number of household members in working age (15-64)
Density: average number of stems per squared meter for each food crop; number
of trees per ha for tree crops.
Material: dummy for use technologically advanced seeds and techniques for each
crop (0=no,1=yes);
Layout: dummy for modern layout of the plot (0=no,1=yes);
18Number of plots: total number of plots worked by the household.
Extension: dummy for participation in the contact groups of the extension pro-
gramme (0=no,1=yes);
Region and year dummies are interacted to pick up region speci￿c climatic or
otherwise exogenous shocks;
vi: household individual e⁄ect;
uit: ￿white￿ error term.
Notice how the information on crops, density, material and layout is observed at
the crop level for each household in each year (hence the subscript ijt), while the rest
of the information and the ￿xed e⁄ects are at the household level (hence it). J crop
dummies are included among the determinants to control for di⁄erent crops through
di⁄erent intercepts. Information on the density of the crop is crucial, especially for
perennials: yields naturally will be higher the more trees in the same area. This
is important in the Ivorian context where cocoa and co⁄ee plots￿ thickness is an
important sign of the intensity of the overall production unit, and a sign of wealth
of the farmer. Density of the crop tends to change from year to year, indicating
replanting, pruning or eradication of old trees.
There are several possible variations for this equation, involving di⁄erent speci￿-
cations both of the dependent and of the independent variables. In this model yields
are used as a independent variable. While we could have used output, controlling for
land, some observations relating to land size were missing in the dataset, probably
due to data entry mistakes2. As we discussed earlier output (and yields) is measured
as total quantities (per ha in the case of yields). The other speci￿cation tested uses
the aggregate gross value of all crops produced as an independent variable, where dif-
2Data on yields was calculated by interviewers during the survey. For completeness we report in
the appendix the results of the regressions using output as an independent variable and including
land size as a determinant (see table A.4).
19ferent crops are aggregated using local prices; this measure incorporates information
about the selection that the household does in terms of crop mix to produce each year,
so that the ￿nal e⁄ect of extension will include the e⁄ect on crop choice (Weir 1999).
This is an important issue, as the incentive structure created by the variation in crops
prices will have an impact on the decision of the allocation of inputs, including the
distribution of household (and hired) labour on di⁄erent plots. Such variation is not
fully controlled by the labour variable: the number of household members in working
age does not contain any decision of the farmer. The labour variable is, in other
words, inaccurately measured. But if the crop choice is determined, among other
things, by the interaction with the extension agent, then the imposed exogeneity of
the labour measure allows us to identify fully this e⁄ect.
While the advantages of the panel data approach, in terms of precision of the esti-
mation, are undeniable, some concerns can derive from the implicit choice of ￿learn-
ing model￿ for the households that such methodology implies. In fact our estimation
method (based on yearly di⁄erences) implies that we will look only at the farmers
that ￿change status￿ in terms of contact with extension agents; computationally this
means that farmers that become members of an extension group - from one year to
the other - will generate a 1 in the extension variables, while farmers that loose their
membership status will generate a -1 on the extension variable. It can be argued that
while joining extension probably generates a certain amount of knowledge, quitting
the programme does not imply losing all the knowledge previously acquired. It would
be more appropriate to model the learning process with a cumulative variable, that
would imply a capacity to retain the knowledge even after losing the membership in
a contact group (Kortum, 1997). In other words, let K be the stock of knowledge,
we would expect that people can add on to it, but not subtract from it; therefore we
would like K to behave accordingly: be strictly increasing and weakly concave. It is
20important to keep this factor in mind when discussing the results: the individual ￿xed
e⁄ects regression, despite the advantages in terms of precision of the estimator, allows
us to look only at the impact of joining the extension programme on the variation of
output. To overcome this limitation we try a di⁄erent speci￿cation for extension, in
which we accumulate the years of membership in the extension programme for each
household. We construct the variable in the context of the panel regression: we set it
up to see whether the cumulated years of experience have an impact on the variation
in production e¢ciency from one year to the other. This speci￿cation helps over-
coming the preoccupations on a potential arti￿cially negative impact of leaving the
extension programme and allows us to have estimates of a relatively longer e⁄ect of
extension (limited to only two years given the limitation of the dataset). A drawback
of this speci￿cation, on the other side, is that a positive coe¢cient implies that the
longer membership in extension has a dynamic e⁄ect on production, i.e. that it is
associated to increasing growth rates in output. It is not clear whether the advice
that comes with extension services - especially for food crops - could have such an
e⁄ect.
Another concern with the within estimator is that it will control only for ￿xed,
i.e. time invariant, e⁄ects only. If there is an unobservable dynamic e⁄ect, i.e. we
believe that it may in￿uence the ability to change rather than (only) the levels of
yields, then ￿xed e⁄ects techniques will not be su¢cient to guarantee identi￿cation.
If this was the case then only further di⁄erencing and a dynamic panel data estimator
(such as the Arellano-Bond estimator) would allow to control for such an e⁄ect: this
solution - though - is not feasible in this context due to the short time span available
in this dataset.
The context in which this theoryon therole oftechnology di⁄usion on productivity
is tested has some reassuring characteristics. Firstly the problem of endogenous
21placement bias is not very insidious in our case, as the extension programme run
by ANADER is managed out of local o¢ces evenly spread through the country,
according to quite strict regulations. Such o¢ces were not built ex-novo, but where
the long established o¢ces part of the ANADER network, that is well known for its
capillary presence on the territory. Such precise placement rules, together with the
characteristics of the agency, provide good grounds to consider the placement of the
programme exogenous.
Moreover the modality of the visits by the extension agents provide good grounds
to dismiss concerns regarding simultaneity bias: in fact the agents have to visit the
households followinga strict timetable, decided together with their supervisors. They
visit each of the households which are registered as members of the programme once
every two weeks. Single farmers do not have the opportunity to require ￿ad hoc￿
visits from the agent, and the agent himself is subject to random checks from his/her
supervisor to monitor whether he is following the visits on the timetable (ANADER,
1999).
One factor that introduces a source of concern is the quality of the extension
variable. According to the o¢cers who supervise the programme in Abidjan, some
of the farmers who were originally selected for the programme did not attend regu-
larly, while other farmers who weren￿t selected started attending becoming, de facto,
involved in the programme. According to the designers of the survey the people who
answered yes to the involvement in the extension contact groups were both the ones
who were only technically inscribed in the list but did not participate, and the ones
who were actually going to the demonstrations and to the meetings despite not being
o¢cially chosen by ANADER. The e⁄ect of such a bias would anyway be a underes-
timation of the coe¢cient. There is yet another source of concern connected to the
quality of the service: during the period of crisis it is likely that some of the sched-
22uled extension visits will have not happened, mainly due to the lack of means to pay
the agents and to ￿nance their travelling to the farmers (mainly gas and motorbike
maintenance costs). So farmers who were living in more isolated locations might have
been disadvantaged in terms of extension received. While their location is ￿xed, and
therefore picked up in the ￿xed e⁄ect estimate, the in￿uence of the location on the
estimates of the impact of extension services maybe dynamic and vary across the
years of analysis. In other words some farmers who were still visited by the agent
in 1997 might have been subsequently uno¢cially dropped from the agent￿s roaster
since they were too far from his base. Unfortunately there is little we can do to avoid
this bias: ideally we could insert a variable for the distance from the farmer￿s plots
to the residence of the agent, but such information is unfortunately not available.
6T h e r e s u l t s
Table10 summarizes theresultsfrom the￿xed e⁄ects regression speci￿ed in (6), where
the dependent variable is yields (quantity of crop in kg per ha of land - where both
harvested quantity and land are crop speci￿c).3 The ￿rst column reports the results
for the whole sample. Labour and the number of plots available to the household
seem to be the only determinants of yields. Next we look at the two crops separately
(columns 2 and 3) and ￿nally at the full sample but with the key variable interacted
with the crop type (column 4): in this setting labour and density variables take
the sign we expexted. The impact of extension membership on food crops￿ yields
is positive and signi￿cant in all the speci￿cations. The magnitude of the coe¢cient
varies between .298 and .48, implying a elasticity between 33% and 61%
4.T h el o w e r
3Results of the OLS regressions are reported in the Appendix (table A.3)
4the formula used to obtain the elasticity is the following: 100 ⁄ g = 100 ⁄f exp(c) ¡ 1g were
g i st h er e l a t i v ee ⁄ e c t( s ot h a t100 ⁄ g is the percentage e⁄ect, and c is the estimated coe¢cinet
23bound coe¢cient seems to be a more accurate estimate of the e⁄ect: due to the
fewer observations in the separate regressions for food crops the accuracy of the ￿xed
e⁄ects is limited (the F test deteriorates considerably in this regression). This implies
that the coe¢cients for extension - in the food crops only model - might be biased
upwards due to unobservable di⁄erences among the farmers not beingcontrolled fully
by individual ￿xed e⁄ects. The results reported with interactions seem to be much
more robust, despite introducing some inevitable rigidity in the production function.
These show a coe¢cient of extension on foodcrops production of .298 implying a
elasticity of 33.5%, which is in line with the literature (Feder et al., 1991 Evenson,
forthcoming). The positive impact on food crops is coherent with the information
collected on the nature of extension services over the years of analysis: the agency
was in fact focusing on short term advice on food crops during the crisis period.
It is likely that in this context farmers advised by extension agents switched from
commercial crops to food crops; in this di¢cult period food crops were also a way of
guaranteeing survival for the household. This might be part of the reason we see such
a strong impact of extension on food crops: farmers might simply put more e⁄ort
in their food crops production once they receive the agent￿s advice. This change in
the levels of e⁄ort is not easy to detect or describe with a variable: farmers will in
fact not switch crops completely, but simply invest more time and resources in more
pro￿table crops, leaving co⁄ee on the side but, naturally, not deplanting the existing
trees. Given the data limitations it is not possible, in this context, to distinguish
what proportion of the increase in productivity is due to improved technology and to
increase in e⁄ort.
Table 11 reports the results of the value regressions, where the independent vari-
for the dummy variable). See Halvorsen and Palmquist 1990 for details about the calculation of
dichotomous variables elasticity in a semilogarithmic setting.
24able is the aggregated value of all crops￿ output. Since price data series were not
available for food crops (for 1997 to 2000) but only for commercial crops, the food
prices had to be simulated. Prices were available for 1997 for each crop in each
county5. These prices were therefore in￿ated with a food-speci￿c price index to cre-
ate a series of prices for 1998, 1999 and 2000 (IMF, 2001). The ￿rst three columns
report the ￿xed e⁄ects regression while the last three report the results of OLS re-
gression with robust standard errors. The impact of extension on food crops seems
to disappear in this setting. In the OLS setting the impact of extension on perennial
crops seem to be negative. The reasons behind such results may be linked to the
fact that in this setting we are looking at revenues. In absolute terms the monetary
revenue produced by commercial crops is higher than the one produced by food crops
sold in the local market. This doesn￿t imply that commercial crops aremore pro￿table
in the long term: they only generate a bigger cash ￿ow. If farmers switched from
commercial crops (such as cocoa and co⁄ee) to food crops then it is possible that
their overall revenue decreases despite the choice still makes sense in terms of prof-
itability of the choice. This seems to be consistent with the negative trends observed
in the aggregate production and - especially - aggregate revenue produced by cash
crops in the country over the years in analysis (see ￿gure 2 and ￿gure 3, IMF 2000).
Furthermore if many farmers decided to focus their production on food crops, then
the prices for food crops relative to commercial crops might have decreased due to
the higher supply of food crops in the market. This seems to be the case looking at
the relative price index of food as opposed to cash crops, at least in the period 1998-
1999. This could explain while despite the more e¢cient production of food crops
the overall revenue might have not increased proportionally. Interestingly the OLS
5Crops prices were collected in 1997 in the househld survey. Due to the noisy nature of the price
data, median values were constructed for each crop in each county.
25regressions seem to suggest a negative impact of extension on the revenue produced
by commercial crops, a result which seems to ￿t the proposed explanations.
As we noticed earlier the dataset does not contain speci￿c information on variable
inputs. Still household ￿xed e⁄ect, that is the households￿ unobservable ￿ability￿,
will include the di⁄erences in level of usage of variable inputs, such as fertilizers and
oxen pairs. Other inputs, such as machinery or tools, are less of a worry, given we can
expect very little variation in households￿ durables over the three years of analysis.
As a further check, anyway, we try a di⁄erent speci￿cation of the model which trades
the advantages of the panel dataset to include some of the information available on
variable inputs for one year only (such as tools and livestock). The results indicate
that their inclusion does not change the results in any material way. The results are
reported in the Appendix (see table A.1).
Table 12 reports the results for the cumulative knowledge speci￿cation proposed.
Here we assume that knowledge is retained over time, even if the household stops
being an extension member. We test directly the regression for the entire sample
interacting the cumulated knowledgevariables with food and perennial cropsdummies
to increase the prediction power of the within estimator. The ￿rst column reports the
results for the model with only the cumulated extension variables. Standard errors
are higher than in the previous regressions, indicating that overall this speci￿cation
of extension does not seem to ￿t the data very well. There seem to be no returns to
cumulated years of extension for food crops: this indicates, as it was predictable, that
in the case of food crops the advantages of extension wear o⁄ after the ￿rst year. This
is consistent with the immediate impact of advice on food crops, focused mainly on
pesticides treatment and product quality (see table 1). The second column reports
the results for a model in which we include both our original extension membership
variables and the cumulative knowledge ones. Interestingly both results seem to be
26robust to this new speci￿cation. We ￿nd again the familiar results with a positive
and signi￿cant coe¢cient associated to the extension variable when interacted with
the food crops dummy (with a magnitude of 0.35 equal to a direct elasticity of 42%).
There is still no evidence of any impact of cumulated years of extension on the food
crops￿ yields, con￿rming that theextension advice concentrated on short run solutions
and wore o⁄ after the ￿rst year.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The impact of extension services on yields in the period from 1997 to 2000, which
coincides with some of the worst years in thehistory of independent C￿te d￿Ivoire, has
been mixed. The main conclusion of this paper is that food crops production seems to
havebene￿ted signi￿cantly from extension services. At thesametime the analysis did
not show any signi￿cant impact of extension on the production of co⁄ee and cocoa
- the major export crops. The magnitude of the impact must be interpreted with
care: the in￿uence of the crisis in international co⁄ee and cocoa prices on the e⁄ort
levels and crop-mix choice of farmers has played an important role in the trends of
the yields of these crops. According to the various results obtained through di⁄erent
speci￿cations the elasticity of production to extension lies in the 30% range. This
result is in line with the existing literature on short term impact of extension on food
crops. The non-signi￿cative or negative elasticity of co⁄ee production to extension
seems to suggest that the distribution of farmers￿ e⁄ort and resources among their
crops has changed considerably during these last year.
The fact that there is apparently no e⁄ect of extension on revenue seems in line
with the overall tendency to switch e⁄orts from high-revenue crops to lower revenue
ones, such as cassava and rice. Better price and labour data, together with a longer
27time dimension in the panel data, would allow to draw more robust conclusions on
this issue (for example by enabling to introduce techniques to control for dynamic
unobservable e⁄ects). Extra data would also allow further work on the impact of
cumulated knowledge on yields.
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Testing for multicollinearity





















1.is the coe¢cient of correlation obtained by regressing the x1 on the rest
of the determinant variables included in the original regression. This expression is,
therefore, a valid expression for the variance of thecoe¢cient estimated for x1,o u rb1.
It is easy to see that adding to our speci￿cation a variable which is highly correlated
with x1 would imply a higher R2
1. and a corresponding increase in the whole variance
of b1. Simple correlation in the variables, therefore, might underestimate the impact
on variances, and therefore on the precision of the estimation. A simple rule has been
suggested to check the robustness of the speci￿cation to multicollinearity. Should the
overall R2 in the original regression be lower than the R2
i from the single ￿partial￿
regressions, then we would have reasons to worry. In fact, the estimated variance for







(n ¡ K)(1¡ R2
i.)Sii
This expression indicates why this quick rule is a good estimate of possible bias
in the results.
32In our sample the total R2 , obtained from the overall regression (estimated with
OLS toobtain theR2) is 0.8221, whiletheR2
i. once weregress the ￿suspect￿ regressors
onto the rest of the dependent variables are 0.3793 for the quality of the material and
0.3303 for the layout of the ￿elds. These results indicate that there is no risk of
multicorrelation in the original regression.
33Including information on capital
Table A.1
1998: without oxen 1998: with oxen pooled: without oxen pooled: with oxen
ln(yield)
ln(density) * food crops 0.32 0.318 -0.025 -0.027
1.62 1.57 -1.13 -1.21
ln(density) * perennials 0.076 0.055 0.127*** 0.121***
0.7 0.49 3.48 2.99
ln(labour) * perennials 0.225** 0.244** 0.285*** 0.294***
2.08 2.21 4.2 3.93
ln(labour) * food crops 0.169 0.167 0.077 0.075
0.92 0.9 0.92 0.88
Seeds quality (crop speci￿c) 0.052 0.069 0.044 0.041
0.56 0.7 0.84 0.75
Plot layout (for perennials) 0.126 0.123 0.099 0.098
1.51 1.46 1.54 1.48
Extension * perennials 0.009 0.02 -0.067 -0.063
0.09 0.2 -1.12 -0.01
Extension * food crops 0.526*** 0.537*** 0.253*** 0.249***
2.94 2.96 3.2 2.97
Number of plots 0.183*** 0.181*** 0.231*** 0.247***
4.65 4.54 8.16 8.19
ln(numb.of oxen)* food crops 0.227 0.003
1.43 0.03
ln(numb.of oxen) * perennials -0.017 -0.042
-0.31 -0.94
Fixed e⁄ects No No No No
Year dummies No No Yes Yes
Observations 345 341 1156 1063
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.53The panel dataset collected between 1997 and 2000 lacks also information on cap-
ital. This could be cause of concerns regarding the production function we are trying
to estimate: excluding information on capital utilized by farmers might introduce
an omitted variable problem. Nevertheless the survey contains, only for 1998, some
information on cattle belonging to the households. Such information can be used to
proxy for capital usage in the production procedures of the household (Weir, 1999).
Since we cannot obtain information for the subsequent years, it is not possible to
insert this variable in the within estimation setting (since it is time invariant). We
report, therefore, the results of the cross sectional regression for 1998, where het-
eroskedasticity is corrected with robust standard errors. In 1998 only 15% of the
interviewed households reported using oxen in their production. The absence of ￿xed
e⁄ect, given the cross sectional nature of this speci￿cation, introduces a bias in the
extension coe¢cient which seems much higher (for 1998) than the one we ￿nd in
the ￿xed e⁄ects estimation. This e⁄ect gives an example of the caution necessary in
interpreting the results deriving from single year cross sectional analysis, a problem
that is emerging clearly in the literature (Owens et al. 2003). Comparing the results
reported in the two columns it is clear that the introduction of the extra variable
does not have a signi￿cant impact on the extension variables. Indeed the e⁄ect of
oxen on yields is not signi￿cant, even if for 1998 and for food crops (which are the
crops which would bene￿t from the use of oxen pairs) the coe¢cient is positive and
on the edge of signi￿cant area. Running a Wald test on the oxen variables, which
results are reported in the following table, con￿rms that the coe¢cients are jointly
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0, and that the variables can therefore be omitted
from the model. Pooling across years considering the oxen constant across the years
of analysis as it was in 1998, the results are similar. The Wald test for the exclusion
of the oxen variables indicates that they are jointly non signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0.
35There seem to be enough evidence not to be too concerned about the robustness of
the extension coe¢cients to the omission of variable capital variables such as oxen.
Table A.2
restrictions tested 1998 all crops 1998-2000 pooled all crops
ln(numb.of oxen)* perennials=0
ln(numb.of oxen)* food crops=0
F statistic F( 2, 311) = 1.09 F( 2, 1026) = 0.45
Prob>FP r o b > F = 0.3388 Prob > F =0.6406
36Table A.3
This table reports the OLS results of the regression in (X)
all crops food crops perennials all crops
with interaction
ln(yields)
ln(labour) 0.210*** 0.053 0.285***
4.02 0.64 4.23
ln(labour) * perennials 0.285***
4.2
ln(labour) * food crops 0.077
0.92
ln(density) 0.025 0.018 0.129***
1.3 0.69 3.45
ln(density) * perennials 0.127***
3.48
ln(density) * food crops 0.285***
4.2
number of plots 0.209*** 0.437*** 0.205*** 0.231***
7.58 4.13 7.11 8.16
extension 0.036 0.230*** -0.079
0.76 2.96 -1.32
extension * perennials -0.067
-1.12
extension * food crops 0.253***
3.2
Observations 1156 469 687 1156
￿xed e⁄ects No No No No
R-squared 0.52 0.48 0.28 0.53
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; ***
signi￿cant at 1%
37Table A.4
This table reports the results for the same speci￿cation as the one reported in
table 10, but where the independent variable is ln(total production) and ln(total
land) is included among the determinants.
all crops food crops only perennials only all crops
with interaction
ln(total production)
ln(land) 1.511*** 1.439*** 1.301*** 1.491***
28.83 14.05 17.82 28.15
ln(labour) 0.394** 1.687*** -0.058
2.33 3.52 -0.31
ln(labour) * perennial 0.373**
2.2
ln(labour) * food crops 0.362*
1.89
ln(density) 0.033 0.066 0.132**
1.38 1.59 2.04
ln(density) * perennials 0.149***
2.94
ln(density) * food crops 0.000
0.000
extension 0.061 0.473** -0.095
0.71 2.32 -0.97
extension * perennials 0.023
0.25
extension * food crops 0.232**
2.04
tot number of plots 0.01 0.037 0.03 0.02
0.24 0.22 0.62 0.51
Observations 1156 469 687 1156
Panel individuals 482 306 373 482
Average obs 2.4 1.5 1.8 2.4
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; ***
signi￿cant at 1%
38Table 1. Innovations di⁄used by ANADER.
Crops Training themes farmers adopting farmers with previous
innovation(%) knowledge(%)
CASH CROPS
Cocoa Crop maintenance 25
Soil preparation
and distancing 0 32
Product quality 49.3
Pesticide treatment 32.2
Co⁄ee Crop maintenance 27.9







and distancing 23.8 20.6
Product quality 27.5
Cassava Design of a plant nursery 0
Soil preparation 1.4
and distancing 35.2
Rice Soil fertilization 31.6




Tomatoes Usage of manure 0
Soil fertilization 50
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International prices of co⁄ee and cocoa 1994-2000 (fCFA/kg)
Source: IMF(2001)
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
household characteristics
average total land owning (ha) 3.1
average number of plots per household 4.34
average household size (numb. of members) 5.65
% of household owning livestock 2.62%
% of households using more than 30 man-days hired workforce 14.7%
% of households using fertilizers 11.7%
% of households using pesticides (more than 5kg per year) 9.25%
% of farmers owning mechanic tools less than 1%
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Figure 2:

















Overall quantity of food crops produced in the country, 1997-2000.
42Table 3. Cross sectional regression.
Perennials Food crops Perennials Food crops
ln(output in kg) ln(output value in 000 fCFA)
ln(crop speci￿c plot surface in ha) .886** .865** .838** .706**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(hhsize) .321** .133 .392** .140**
(0.000) (0.099) (0.000) (0.002)
ln(workforce in man-days) .049** .080** .036** .073**
(0.020) (0.002) (0.008) (0.000)
ln(pesticides in kg/year) .236** .061 .182** .073**
(0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.008)
ln(fertilizers in kg/year) .123* .024 .083* .032
(0.033) (0.283) (0.039) (0.141)
Female hh head dummy -.241 -.088 -.253** -.084
(0.077) (0.360) (0.008) (0.268)
Indigenous household dummy -.309** .044 -.215** -.154**
(0.008) (0.687) (0.001) (0.008)
Years of schooling of hh head -.022** .016 -.017** -.003
(0.001) (0.156) (0.002) (0.649)
Young trees dummy (only for perennials) -1.176** - -.223 -
(0.003) - (0.069) -
Tot. observations 6724 9766 6459 6407
R-squared 0.3197 0.3006 0.3425 0.2227
Notes: P ¡ values in parentheses; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; ***
signi￿cant at 1%
43Table 4. Descriptive statistics. Cocoa
Ave. Output(kg) Ave. land surf. Ave. Density Ave. yields
(ha) (stems/ha) (kg/ha)
1998 Mean 2861.9 2.9 1034.5 943.9
Median 2010.5 2.3 1022.1 888.8
Std. Dev. 2305.5 2.4 315.4 341.7
1999 Mean 2136.4 3.1 982.8 542.2
Median 1476.8 2.2 977 453.3
Std. Dev. 2081.9 2.6 352.1 277.6
2000 Mean 1405.2 1.9 968.9 622.4
Median 966.4 1.3 977 586.7
Std. Dev. 1493.2 1.7 361.8 295.4
Table 5 . Descriptive statistics. Co⁄ee.
Ave. Output(kg) Ave. land surf.(ha) Ave. Density Ave. yields (kg/ha)
(stems/ha)
1998 Mean 1840.5 2.6 909.1 371.1
Median 1530 2.1 844.4 357.8
Std. Dev. 1166.2 1.5 278.9 124.35
1999 Mean 1973.1 2.8 911.1 327.2
Median 1592.9 2.3 888.9 333.35
Std. Dev. 1557.5 2.1 324 145.45
2000 Mean 1499.1 2.4 836.2 328.5
Median 1002.4 1.8 800 346.65
Std. Dev. 1475.8 2 257.5 145.8
Table 6. Descriptive statistics. Rice.
Rice
Ave. Output(kg) Ave. land surf.(ha) Ave. yields (kg/ha)
1998 Mean 1421.7 .88 1590.6
Median 1237.5 .77 1625
Std. Dev. 862.6 .54 366.7
1999 Mean 1846.3 .96 1756.9
Median 1350 .83 1812.5
Std. Dev. 1490.1 .54 776.4
2000 Mean 1655.1 .86 1435.9
Median 1232.8 .76 1406.25
Std. Dev. 1340.8 .49 441.5
44Table 7. Descriptive statistics. Yam
Yam
Ave. Output(kg) Ave. land surf.(ha) Ave. yields (kg/ha)
1998 Mean 6687.9 .43 12534.2
Median 5019.6 .33 11500
Std. Dev. 4780.9 .30 3204.2
1999 Mean 6890.4 .46 1462.9
Median 6057.9 .40 13700
Std. Dev. 4914.3 .28 7351.7
2000 Mean 6121.9 .50 9984.75
Median 5324 .41 10045
Std. Dev. 4232.6 .30 2782.5
Table 8. Extension programme participation rates





Table 9. Variation in extension programme participation
% (total observation)
Never a member 65% (569 hh)
Left during the period 6.6% (59 hh)
Joined during the period 9.4% (83 hh)
Always member 19% (169 hh)
45Table 10 - Dependent variable is ln(yields). Within estimator (with ￿xed e⁄ects).
All crops Perennials Food crops All crops
with interaction
ln(yields)




ln(labour)* food crops 0.244
(1.20)
ln(crop density) 0.006 0.140** 0.052
(0.24) (2.11) (1.20)
ln(crop density)* perennials 0.162***
(2.99)
ln(crop density)* food crops -0.040
(-1.42)
number of plots 0.136*** 0.108** 0.154 0.148***
(3.36) (2.37) (0.87) (3.36)
extension 0.081
(0.88)
extension * perennials -0.086 0.026
(-0.85) (0.26)
extension * food crops 0.481** 0.298**
(2.23) (2.46)
Tot. observations 1156 687 469 1156
Fixed e⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel individuals 482 373 306 482
average obs. per panel 2.4 1.8 1.5 2.4
F test on ￿xed e⁄ects=0; Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; ***
signi￿cant at 1%
46Table 11 - Value regressions: dependent variable is ln(value of output).
Perennials Food All crops Perennials Food All crops
crops with interactions crops with interactions
ln(value of output in fCFA) ln(value of output in fCFA)
ln(crop speci￿c plot surface in ha) 0.986*** 1.426*** 1.221*** 1.366*** 1.330*** 1.394***
6.74 10.80 9.88 18.86 16.44 16.54
ln(labour) -0.242 1.065 -0.214 0.211** 0.211** 0.261***
-0.69 1.51 -0.49 2.26 2.28 2.78
Plot layout (for perennials only) -0.048 - -0.203 0.212** - -0.202**
-0.34 -1.33 2.45 -2.07
tot number of plots -0.059 -0.053 -0.177** 0.020 0.039* 0.028
-0.86 -0.45 -2.55 1.13 1.79 1.14
Modern seed type (crop speci￿c) 0.089 0.047 0.294 0.123 0.133 0.292**
0.47 0.25 1.47 1.17 1.54 2.55
extension -0.325** -0.039 0.121 -0.232*** 0.004 -0.034
-2.54 0.26 0.80 2.89 0.05 0.39
Tot. observations 594 647 832 594 647 832
Panel individuals 399 481 574
average obs. per panel 1.5 1.3 1.4
Fixed e⁄ects YES YES YES NO NO NO
Year dummies NO NO NO YES YES YES
F test on ￿xed e⁄ects=0; Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - -
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; ***
signi￿cant at 1%Table 12 - Cumulative knowledge model
All crops All crops
with interaction with ext. var.
ln(yields)
ln(labour)* perennials 0.172 0.415**
(1.08) (2.29)
ln(labour)* food crops 0.074 0.263
(0.42) (1.29)
ln(crop density)*perennials 0.158*** 0.168***
(3.60) (3.07)
ln(crop density)*food crops -0.002 -0.051*
(-0.09) (1.76)
number of plots 0.026 0.151***
(1.14) (3.74)
cumulated knowledge * per 0.011 0.014
(0.27) (0.32)
cumulated knowledge * food -0.011 -0.049
(-0.26) (-1.15)
extension * perennials -0.003
(-0.03)
extension * food crops 0.353***
(2.79)
Tot. observations 1459 1156
Panel individuals 533 482
average obs. per panel 2.7 2.4
F test on ￿xed e⁄ects=0; Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; ***
signi￿cant at 1%
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